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I. INTRODUCTION 
The dispute in Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren1 is over six billion 
years in the making: as the Earth formed from a cloud of matter 
produced in the aftermath of a supernova, uranium settled in the 
Earth’s mantle, eventually migrated toward the surface, and formed 
concentrations in the Earth’s crust.2 One particularly massive 
concentration came to rest just beneath the surface of the Coles Hill 
estate in Pittsylvania County, Virginia.3 Shortly after the discovery of 
this deposit in the late 1970s, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a 
ban on uranium mining within its borders.4 Petitioners, who own the 
deposit, argue that Virginia’s ban is preempted by the Atomic Energy 
Act (“AEA”),5 which reserves to the federal government the power 
to regulate public safety relating to radioactive materials.6 
Respondents, the Commonwealth of Virginia, contend that the AEA 
 
Copyright ©2019 Francis X. Liesman. 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2020.1. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 
138 S. Ct. 2023 (May 21, 2018) (No. 16-1275). 
 2.  See The Cosmic Origins of Uranium, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/uranium-resources/the-
cosmic-origins-of-uranium.aspx (last visited Nov. 24, 2018). 
 3.  See Joint Appendix at 39, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, No. 16-1275, 2018 WL 3546785 
(Jul. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Joint Appendix] (“Virginia Uranium, Inc. . . . wants to mine the 119-
million pound deposit of the radioactive ore in Pittsylvania County”).  
 4.  See Va. Code Ann. § 45.1-283. 
 5.  Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755. 
 6.  See Brief for Petitioners at 11, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, No. 16-1275, 2018 WL 
3546327 (Jul. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. 
LIESMAN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2019  2:44 PM 
20 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
does not preempt the ban, and that Virginia’s moratorium is 
permissible under current Supreme Court precedent.7 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ analysis of the AEA’s 
preemptive effect in Virginia Uranium relied on interpreting the 
meaning of “activities” in 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k).8 Concluding that 
uranium mining is not an “activit[y]” within the meaning of the 
statute, the panel upheld Virginia’s ban.9 In doing so, however, the 
panel overlooked Congress’s vital instruction, conveyed by the plain 
language of § 2021(k), that courts conduct a purposive inquiry into 
why a state may be regulating these “activities.”10 
This commentary highlights the considerations the Supreme Court 
should attend to in construing § 2021(k), and in reviewing the Fourth 
Circuit’s reading of precedent from other circuits and from the 
Court’s prior opinions. Specifically, the Court must clarify how to 
interpret § 2021(k)’s activities component in concert with its “for 
purposes” language and determine the importance of the particular 
underlying activity the state seeks to regulate in a preemption analysis 
under the AEA. Clarification is necessary to ensure that courts 
properly effectuate Congress’s intent in regulating nuclear power, an 
important regulatory realm that implicates economic growth, 
technological development, and foreign policy. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Uranium ore is the primary source of fuel for nuclear power 
plants.11 Conventional uranium mining involves three processes.12 
First, uranium ore is extracted from its natural source.13 Second, the 
ore is milled into usable form in a process that separates the uranium 
from the waste rock, or “tailings.”14 Third, the uranium is concentrated 
 
 7.  See Brief for Respondents at 1–3, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, No. 16-1275, 2018 WL 
4105540 (Aug. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents]. 
 8.  See Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590, 595–97 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 9.  See id. 
 10.  See id. at 608 (Traxler, J. dissenting). 
 11.  See id. at 593. 
 12.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 9. 
 13.  See id. 
 14.  Id. 
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into “yellowcake”15 and sold to be enriched, while the tailings, which 
remain radioactive, are stored in a secure facility.16 
Virginia Uranium, Inc. owns the largest natural deposit of uranium 
ore in the United States.17 Shortly after the discovery of the uranium 
deposit in Coles Hill, the Virginia General Assembly called for the 
state Coal and Energy Commission to “evaluate the environmental 
effects . . . and any possible detriments to the health, safety, and 
welfare of Virginia citizens which may result from uranium 
exploration, mining or milling.”18 Before the Commission reported its 
findings, the Assembly imposed a moratorium on uranium mining 
pending the creation of a statutory regime to govern the issuance of 
uranium mining permits.19 After a two-year inquiry, the Commission 
released its report and recommended lifting the ban.20 Sixteen of the 
eighteen members of the Commission endorsed the report, while two 
members dissented.21 Despite the Commission’s findings that the 
benefits of mining uranium in Virginia “outweighed the costs 26 to 1,” 
the Assembly opted not to lift the moratorium.22 
Over the next twenty years, uranium prices fell significantly and 
Virginia Uranium did not pursue plans to further develop the Coles 
Hill deposit.23 Lawmakers began reconsidering the mining ban in the 
mid-2000s,24 and a bill was sponsored in 2013 to develop a licensing 
scheme for issuing uranium mining permits.25 That bill was withdrawn 
without a vote; the moratorium remains in effect.26 
In 2015, Virginia Uranium sued the Commonwealth’s officers in 
the Western District of Virginia and sought a declaration that the ban 
was preempted by federal law and an injunction requiring the 
 
 15.  Yellowcake consists of the concentrated and dried uranium product that is sold 
commercially and shipped to enrichment facilities. See Va. Uranium, 848 F.3d at 601 (Traxler, J. 
dissenting). 
 16.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 9. 
 17.  See id. at 8. 
 18.  Va. Uranium, 848 F.3d at 593 (quoting 1981 Va. Acts. 1404).   
 19.  See Va. Uranium, 848 F.3d at 593. 
 20.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 17. 
 21.  See id. at 17–18 (explaining that “radiological safety concerns raised by tailings 
management operations” formed the basis of the dissenters’ opposition).  
 22.  Va. Uranium, 848 F.3d at 593 (referring to finding in Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 
133).   
 23.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 17. 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  See Va. Uranium, 848 F.3d at 593. 
 26.  See id. 
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Commonwealth to issue uranium mining permits.27 The 
Commonwealth moved to dismiss the complaint and Virginia 
Uranium moved for summary judgment.28 The district court granted 
Virginia’s motion to dismiss,29 a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed,30 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.31 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The issue presented in Virginia Uranium implicates the 
constitutional doctrine of preemption, the federal regulatory 
framework governing atomic energy, and a line of cases applying 
preemption principles to that framework. The specific statutory 
provision at issue is 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k), which reads, “Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local 
agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against 
radiation hazards.”32 The provision’s express recognition of state 
authority permits the negative inference that states are preempted 
from regulating activities to “protect[] against radiation hazards.” In 
the past, the Court has read this provision to preempt states from 
regulating nuclear activities for radiological safety purposes while 
permitting states to regulate activities for non-safety reasons such as 
“need, reliability, cost, and other state-related concerns.33 
The crux of the issue is that Virginia contends that its ban 
regulates uranium mining, which is not an activity within the meaning 
of the AEA. Virginia Uranium argues, however, that this regulation of 
mining, which it concedes falls within the traditional state police 
powers, is really a veiled regulation of milling and tailings 
management (two activities under the AEA) for radiological safety 
purposes and is therefore preempted. 
 
 27.  See id. at 594. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  Va. Uranium, Inc. v. McAuliffe, 147 F. Supp. 3d 462, 471 (W.D. Va. 2015) (finding that 
the Atomic Energy Act does not govern conventional mining of nonfederal uranium deposits 
and concluding that the Virginia statute imposing the moratorium is not preempted). 
 30.  See Va. Uranium, 848 F.3d at 599. 
 31.  See Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 138 S. Ct. 2023 (May 21, 2018) (No. 16-1275). 
 32.  42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 33.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 204 (1983). 
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A. The Preemption Doctrine 
The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause,34 
which dictates that when both federal and state law bear on one 
particular regulatory realm, or stand in conflict with one another, 
federal law preempts and invalidates the state law. Congress may 
either explicitly preempt state law through express statutory language 
or may do so implicitly.35 In determining whether state law is 
preempted absent explicit statutory language, the primary inquiry is 
“whether Congress intended to displace state law . . . .”36 
State law may be implicitly preempted when it impinges on a 
“scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room to supplement it.”37 This is 
known as field preemption.38 State law may also be preempted where 
it stands in conflict with a federal regulation such that it imposes “an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress,”39 or when “compliance with both federal 
and state regulations is a physical impossibility.”40 
B. The Atomic Energy Act 
The development and history of the Atomic Energy Act evinces 
an incremental shifting of control over nuclear technology away from 
the United States military and towards private industry. The first 
version of the AEA was enacted a year after the end of World War II 
in 1946.41 The 1946 version of the AEA granted control of nuclear 
technology, previously held exclusively by the United States Army, to 
the federal government,42 and empowered the Atomic Energy 
Commission (now known as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or 
NRC) to issue licenses to non-federal parties seeking to transfer or 
deal in uranium.43 In 1954, Congress amended the AEA to permit 
 
 34.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 35.  See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015). 
 36.  Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 6 (1986). 
 37.  Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203–04. 
 38.  Id. at 204. 
 39.  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 40.  Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
 41.  See Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946). 
 42.  See Brief for Respondents, supra note 7, at 6. 
 43.  See id. 
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“licensing of private construction, ownership, and operation of 
commercial nuclear power reactors . . . under strict supervision by the 
. . .  Commission.”44 Under the 1954 version of the AEA, the 
Commission retained its exclusive licensing authority over “the 
transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear 
materials.”45 These activities take place after uranium is mined. 
In 1959, Congress further amended the AEA to grant states a 
greater role in the development of nuclear power.46 The provisions, 
now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021, facilitated regulatory cooperation 
between states and the NRC; the NRC retained “exclusive authority 
to license the . . . use of all nuclear materials.”47 Under the 1959 
version of the AEA, the NRC was permitted to enter into agreements 
with state executives “for the protection of the public health and 
safety from radiation hazards,”48 only after ensuring that the state’s 
program is “compatible”49 with federal regulations and “adequate to 
protect the public health and safety.”50 
Although, in the first stage of uranium production, mining, the 
NRC maintains only limited authority,51 the NRC has “exclusive 
jurisdiction” over the later stages, milling and tailings management.52 
Under its exclusive jurisdiction, the NRC has extensively regulated 
milling and tailings management to protect public health and safety.53 
These types of regulations would be preempted if a state attempted to 
impose them because the NRC has sole jurisdiction over radiological 
safety concerns in connection with nuclear activities. The provision at 
issue in Virginia Uranium makes clear that “State[s] or local 
agenc[ies]” may “regulate activities for purposes other than protection 
against radiation hazards.”54 Therefore, in order to reach such 
activities, a state must be regulating for purposes other than 
 
 44.  Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 63 (1978). 
 45.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 207 (1983). 
 46.  See id. at 208–209. 
 47.  English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 81 (1990). 
 48.  42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (2012). 
 49.  42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)(2) (2012). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590, 595–97 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 52.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 12 (interpreting provisions such as 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2097 and 2092 that empower the NRC to regulate uranium mining on federal lands and 
processes occurring “after [uranium’s] removal from its place of deposit in nature,” 
respectively). 
 53.  See id. at 13 (citing 10 C.F.R. Pt. 40, App. A.). 
 54.  42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (2012). 
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protection against radiation hazards. Such purposes could include 
economic justifications, costs, and quality of utility power production. 
C. Pacific Gas and Its Progeny 
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & 
Dev. Comm’n,55 the Supreme Court applied its preemption analysis to 
a California regulatory scheme governing the construction of new 
power plants in the state.56 The regulatory scheme authorized 
California’s energy commission to determine whether utilities seeking 
to build new nuclear power plants had adequate storage capacity for 
spent fuel rods.57 A unanimous Court held that as “the federal 
government has occupied the entire field of nuclear concerns,” the 
preemption test was “whether ‘the matter on which the state asserts 
the right to act is in any way regulated by the federal government.’”58 
The Court reasoned that a state ban on “nuclear construction for 
safety reasons would . . . be in the teeth of the Atomic Energy Act’s 
objective to insure that nuclear technology be safe enough for 
widespread development and use—and would be preempted for that 
reason.”59 Ultimately, the Court upheld California’s regulatory 
scheme because it held that the scheme was adopted for economic 
reasons and not for radiological safety purposes.60 
The Court revisited the AEA’s preemptive scope in Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp.61 and English v. General Electric Co..62 Silkwood 
and English both presented AEA preemption theories regarding state 
tort law and the Court clarified the central holding of Pacific Gas on 
both occasions. In Silkwood, the Court asserted that “the federal 
government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety 
concerns,”63 and held that federal law did not preempt a state-law 
“award of punitive damages arising out of the escape of plutonium 
from a federally-licensed nuclear facility.”64 In English, the Court held 
that the state law in question was “not motivated by safety 
 
 55.  461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
 56.  See id. at 197. 
 57.  See id. 
 58.  Id. at 212–13 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)). 
 59.  Id. at 213. 
 60.  See id. at 222. 
 61.  464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
 62.  496 U.S. 72 (1990). 
 63.  Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249. 
 64.  Id. at 241. 
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concerns.”65 The state law did not have a “direct and substantial effect 
on the decisions by those who build or operate safety facilities 
concerning radiological safety levels.”66 Therefore, it was not 
preempted. 
Several circuit courts have interpreted and applied the Pacific Gas 
line of cases, and the purposes for which a state regulated nuclear 
power often dictate the outcome.67 In this case, however, the Fourth 
Circuit declined to conduct the purposive inquiry and instead focused 
solely on the activity, conventional uranium mining, that the Virginia 
ban regulates. 
IV. HOLDING 
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit construed the AEA 
provision at issue, considered the holdings of Pacific Gas, Silkwood, 
and English, distinguished persuasive authority from other circuits, 
and rejected Virginia Uranium’s assertion that the Commonwealth’s 
ban is preempted on three grounds. First, the majority held that 
because the NRC reasonably interprets the AEA to preclude the 
NRC’s regulation of conventional uranium mining on non-federal 
land, and because the power to regulate mining has traditionally been 
reserved to the states, conventional uranium mining is not an 
“activit[y]” under § 2021(k).68 Further, notwithstanding the NRC’s 
admission that milling and tailings storage are “activities” under § 
2021(k), the panel rejected the argument that the moratorium is 
 
 65.  English, 496 U.S. at 84. 
 66.  Id. at 85 (emphasis added). 
 67.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 48–51, citing, inter alia, Skull Valley Band of 
Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1247–48 (10th Cir. 2004) (preempting a state law 
because the pretextual purpose for the regulatory scheme was grounded in safety concerns); 
Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (preempting the 
measure because it was motivated by safety notwithstanding the legislature’s codified purpose 
of furthering the “larger societal discussion of broader economic and environmental issues”); Ill. 
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214–16 (7th Cir. 1982) (preempting Illinois law for interfering 
with the “federal atomic energy program” notwithstanding the residual authority granted to 
states under the Clean Air Act); United States v. Ky., 252 F.3d 816, 823 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(preempting Kentucky’s attempt to regulate nuclear waste storage because the measure was 
based on health and safety concerns); United States v. Manning, 527 F.3d 828, 837–39 (9th Cir. 
2008) (preempting a ballot initiative preventing storage of additional radioactive waste “to 
protect the health and safety of Washington residents and the environment”); Jersey Cent. 
Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1112 (3d Cir. 1985) (preempting a local 
ordinance banning the importation of radioactive waste); Abraham v. Hodges, 255 F. Supp. 2d 
539, 553 (D.S.C. 2002) (preempting a state executive order “prohibiting the transportation of 
plutonium within South Carolina”). 
 68.  Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 2017). 
LIESMAN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2019  2:44 PM 
2019] SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES 27 
preempted because its effect is to regulate milling and tailings storage 
out of safety concerns. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that 
the “mining ban does not purport to regulate an activity within the 
[AEA]’s reach, and thus we need proceed no further.”69 Finally, the 
Fourth Circuit rejected Virginia Uranium’s argument that the 
Commonwealth’s ban “stands as an obstacle” to Congress’s objectives 
with the AEA,70 and affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of 
the Commonwealth. 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioners’ Arguments 
Virginia Uranium’s primary argument is that the field preempted 
by the AEA is partially “defined…by reference to the motivation 
behind the state law” at issue.71 Petitioners contend that the 
preemptive scope of the AEA is defined by § 2021.72 Under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2021(b), states may obtain “authority to regulate the materials 
covered by the agreement for the protection of the public health and 
safety from radiation hazards.”73 When there is no agreement to grant 
the states such authority, states are limited by 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k), 
which permits states “to regulate activities for purposes other than 
protection against radiation hazards.”74 Because the Court held in 
Pacific Gas that when a state enacts a law grounded in radioactive 
safety concerns it “falls squarely within the prohibited field,” and 
because the ban is “motivated by the purpose of protecting against 
the radiological hazards of uranium milling and the storage of 
uranium tailings,”75 the petitioners argue that the Commonwealth’s 
uranium mining ban is preempted.76 
Petitioners advance, furthermore, that the preemptive scope of the 
AEA is defined not only by the “activities” regulated by the NRC, but 
also by the purpose of the state law in question.77 The Court in Pacific 
Gas gave effect to the entire text of § 2021(k) and scrutinized the 
 
 69.  Id. at 598–99. 
 70.  Id. at 599 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 71.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 27 (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 84). 
 72.  See id. 
 73.  42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (2012). 
 74.  42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (2012). 
 75.  Id. at 39. 
 76.  See id. at 33. 
 77.  See id. at 35. 
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activities that states may regulate under the AEA and the “purposes 
they may pursue when enacting regulations of any activity.”78 
Crucially, petitioners argue, the Court in Pacific Gas scrutinized the 
specific activity that California was regulating and “why the state was 
regulating it.”79 According to petitioners, if the Commonwealth’s 
purpose was to regulate safety, as it conceded for the purpose of its 
motion to dismiss, then its moratorium intrudes on the preempted 
field notwithstanding its facial reference to an activity outside the 
NRC’s jurisdiction.80 
Petitioners also argue, based on Arizona v. United States,81 that the 
Commonwealth’s ban should be preempted because it stands as an 
obstacle to a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme.82 In Arizona, 
the state’s regulation was preempted for frustrating the purposes of 
federal immigration policy.83 Here, the Commonwealth’s ban may 
similarly frustrate Congress’s purpose: Congress, by enacting and 
amending the AEA, has evinced its desire to “encourage the private 
development and use of uranium.”84 Permitting one of the fifty states 
to ban uranium mining may not significantly upset Congress’s interest, 
petitioners claim, but if all fifty states enact similar bans, the states 
could collectively stymy Congress’s nuclear power policy goals.85 
Finally, petitioners contend that the Fourth Circuit’s approach 
frustrates the AEA’s chief purpose: promoting the productive use of 
nuclear power.86 The Fourth Circuit’s approach enables state and local 
governments to impede the development of nuclear technology out of 
parochial safety concerns not shared by NRC experts.87 Petitioners 
cite several circuit court decisions where state legislatures enacted 
carefully worded statutes (properly held to be preempted) that 
hindered the state-level development of nuclear power and were 
designed to disguise the state’s true purpose: regulating radiological 
safety.88 If upheld, Virginia’s mining ban offers a roadmap for states 
 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 36. 
 80.  Id. at 40. 
 81.  567 U.S. 387, 401–402 (2012). 
 82.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 56–57. 
 83.  Arizona, 567 U.S. at 402–403. 
 84.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 56–57. 
 85.  See id. at 56–57. 
 86.  See id. at 54. 
 87.  See id. at 46–47. 
 88.  See id. at 48–51, citing, e.g., Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 
1223, 1247–48 (10th Cir. 2004) (preempting a state law because the pretextual purpose for the 
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seeking to regulate nuclear power for radiological safety purposes.89 
States can regulate activities within their purview that are upstream of 
activities regulated by the NRC, and in doing so can evade 
preemption so long as the measures they enact avoid mentioning the 
downstream, preempted activities. This bad legal consequence, 
according to petitioners, is also accompanied by grave practical risks.90 
B. Respondents’ Arguments 
The Commonwealth of Virginia maintains that its moratorium on 
uranium mining is not preempted because the AEA itself “does not 
begin to regulate uranium until ‘after its removal from its place of 
deposit in nature.’”91 Further, respondents contend that § 2021(k) 
does not preempt the ban or any other state activity, but rather 
cautions courts not to presume that state activities are preempted.92 
They urge that this construction aligns with the legislative purpose of 
the 1959 AEA amendment, which focused on enhancing state 
regulatory authority over nuclear technology, rather than restricting 
it.93 Likewise, respondents charge petitioners with omitting key 
language from Pacific Gas and English that indicates a preemptive 
scope limited to state laws that venture into health and safety in the 
context of “nuclear construction,” which “has always been a matter of 
intense federal concern and regulation.”94 Respondents insist that the 
same cannot be said of uranium mining.95 
Respondents also argue that petitioners erroneously rely on 
respondents’ concession at the motion to dismiss stage that the 
moratorium was imposed out of concern for radiological safety.96 If 
the Commonwealth did not in fact concede such a purpose, 
 
regulatory scheme was grounded in safety concerns); Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. 
Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (preempting a measure on after finding it was 
motivated by radiological safety notwithstanding the state’s assurances that it was motivated 
instead by the “larger societal discussion of broader economic and environmental issues”). 
 89.  See id. at 54–59. 
 90.  See id. at 53–54. Petitioners warn that hindering the United States nuclear industry will 
force continued reliance on foreign sources, including “Russia and its client states” that 
currently supply nearly forty percent of the nation’s uranium. 
 91.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 7, at 16 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2092 (2012)). 
 92.  See id. at 23–26. 
 93.  See id. 
 94.  Id. at 28. 
 95.  Id. at 29. 
 96.  See id. at 36–37 (noting that respondents “are aware of no decision of this Court 
treating the identification of that ‘purpose’ [of a given law] as a matter of historical fact under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 
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respondents argue, the Court is left with the tenuous task of 
discerning legislative intent. The Commonwealth warns of the 
“intractable problems”97 introduced when courts assume that the 
purpose of a law is the same as the “subjective intentions of the state 
legislature.”98 In sum, respondents contend that petitioners’ reading of 
§ 2021(k)’s “for the purposes of” language is not quite as convincing 
as petitioners maintain. 
Finally, respondents dismiss petitioners’ obstacle preemption 
argument rooted in Arizona v. United States.99 Respondents reason 
that because the Court in Arizona confronted a “comprehensive 
federal scheme”100 that regulated an activity that the state also sought 
to regulate, the state’s scheme stood as a direct obstacle to Congress’s 
objectives. Here, because the Commonwealth regulates uranium 
mining and the AEA has never regulated the same activity, the 
moratorium presents no obstacle to fulfilling Congress’s objectives.101 
Respondents conjecture that a ruling in favor of Virginia Uranium 
would require the Court to decide that Congress implicitly and 
silently preempted all state authority in the realm of uranium mining, 
contrary to the principle that courts should infer that the historic 
police powers102 are “not to be superseded.”103 Such a ruling would 
render uranium mining, which the NRC does not regulate under 
federal law, also unreachable by state regulation.104 That construction, 
the Fourth Circuit quipped, “cannot be the law.”105 
 
 97.  Id. at 38. 
 98.  Id. at 38–39 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 
U.S. 393, 404 (2010) and summarizing the issues it raises: (1) there could be different outcomes 
for different states imposing identical laws; (2) many laws further more than one particular 
purpose; and (3) obtaining definitive proof of motive for a collective legislative body is 
particularly difficult). 
 99.  567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 100.  Id. at 406 (quoting Puerto Rico Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 
485 U.S. 495, 503 (1988)). 
 101.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 7, at 51. 
 102.  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (“The traditional police power 
of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals, and 
we have upheld such a basis for legislation.”); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419–20 
(1922) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (generally characterizing a state’s regulation of mining 
operations as an “exercise of the police power”). 
 103.  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 485 (1996)). 
 104.  See Brief for Respondents, supra note 7, at 52. 
 105.  Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590, 597 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
A. The Fourth Circuit Inadequately Addressed the Purposive 
Language of 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) 
The Fourth Circuit potentially erred in its treatment of 42 U.S.C. § 
2021(k) when it failed to give effect to the provision’s purposive 
language106 and departed from the approaches pursued by other 
circuit courts.107 The problem with this approach is not so much that it 
avoids the fool’s errand of inquiring into legislative purpose,108 but 
that it disregards Congress’s plain instruction that states may only 
“regulate activities for purposes other than protection against 
radiation hazards.”109 The Fourth Circuit properly discerned that 
conventional uranium mining is not an “activit[y],” but it did not 
finish the analysis: if an activity, unregulated by the NRC, is regulated 
by the state “for purposes other than” radiological safety, the inquiry 
ends.110 When the state’s purpose, however, is to regulate radiological 
safety in the management of milling and tailings storage (two 
activities that are regulated by the NRC), the state law may be within 
the prohibited field, and thus preempted.111 
At oral argument before the Fourth Circuit, petitioners used an 
analogy to convey the problem posed by the Commonwealth’s 
approach to impermissibly regulating activities that actually are under 
the purview of the NRC.112 In prohibiting mining, an upstream activity, 
the Commonwealth has imposed a veiled regulation of downstream 
 
 106.  See id. at 598 (“[W]e decline to examine why the Commonwealth chose to ban 
uranium mining, which it was plainly allowed to do.”). 
 107.  See id. at 609 (Traxler, J. dissenting) (“Until today, each Court of Appeals addressing 
the issue since Pacific Gas has held that state statutes enacted to protect against the radiological 
dangers of activities the AEA regulates are preempted regardless of whether the statutory text 
reveals that purpose and regardless of whether the statute expressly prohibits [it].”); see also 
supra note 67. 
 108.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 404 (2010) 
(“[D]etermining whether state and federal rules conflict based on the subjective intentions of 
the state legislature is an enterprise destined to produce ‘confusion worse confounded.’” 
(quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941))). 
 109.  42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 110.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 199 (1983) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k)). 
 111.  See id.; see also English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 84 (1990). 
 112.  See Oral Argument at 9:53, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 2017), 
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/16-1005-20161028.mp3. In the analogy, the father 
permits his son to borrow the car, but not the keys. The rationale behind the father’s policy is 
not that the keys are dangerous, but that the car is. His policy is facially about the keys, but its 
purpose and effect are to regulate his son’s use of the car out of safety concerns. 
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activities: milling and tailings management. The statute here refers to 
a ban on uranium mining, which is a prerequisite to the milling and 
tailings management that the state is preempted from regulating out 
of safety concerns. The court, however, refused to address the 
purposive language, allowing the state to find a clever way to regulate 
within the preempted field in a facially neutral way.113 But because 
Congress reached these scenarios with the purposive language in § 
2021(k), the panel flouted Congress’s plain instruction by ending the 
preemption analysis once it decided that the regulated conduct was 
not an activity covered by the statute.114 
Were the Supreme Court to affirm the Fourth Circuit’s judgment 
without deciding how the “activities” element balances with the “for 
purposes” element of the provision, it would do damage to the AEA 
and the entire federal regulatory scheme governing nuclear 
technology. The Court should clarify when, under the Pacific Gas 
approach, courts are to conduct the purposive inquiry, and, if it rules 
in favor of Virginia Uranium, it should remand for findings as to the 
Commonwealth’s true purpose behind the moratorium.115 
The advocates grappled with these issues at oral argument before 
the Supreme Court, where the federal government joined petitioners 
as amicus curiae.116 The justices were particularly concerned about the 
proper test that would apply if it held that courts are to conduct a 
purposive inquiry under § 2021(k).117 The federal government argued 
that where the state provides “a plausible non-safety rationale and 
 
 113.  See Brief of Nuclear Energy Institute as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioners at 17, 
Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, No. 16-1275, 2018 WL 3599465 (Jul. 26, 2018) (“A ban targeting 
the radiological risks of those activities interferes with the exclusive authority of the federal 
government and achieves something indirectly that a state could not do directly. Such a result 
turns preemption on its head, allowing a state to purposefully regulate radiological risks and 
short circuit federal regulation so long as the state does not mention safety in the language of 
the law.”). 
 114.  Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203 (finding that the California provision involving an 
“activit[y]” governed by the AEA was not ripe for review, yet still applying the full § 2021(k) 
analysis to the provision covering conduct not subject to NRC jurisdiction); see also Brief of 
United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioners, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, No. 16-
1275, 2018 WL 3599466 (Jul. 26, 2018). 
 115.  This would allay the Commonwealth’s concerns, mentioned supra note 96, that 
petitioners assume too much about what the Commonwealth has conceded in this case.  
 116.  See Adam Liptak, Justices Seem to Support Virginia’s Uranium Mining Ban, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/us/politics/supreme-court-virginia-
uranium-mining.html. Charles Cooper argued for petitioners and was joined by Solicitor 
General Noel Francisco, who argued for the federal government as amicus curiae. 
 117.  See Oral Argument at 9:40, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 138 S. Ct. 2023 (May 21, 
2018) (No. 16-1275), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/16-1275 [hereinafter, Oral Argument]. 
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that rationale is not otherwise foreclosed by the text, legislative 
history, and historical context” of the legislative enactment, the state 
can permissibly regulate under § 2021(k).118 Alternatively, petitioners’ 
original appellate counsel advocated for a less deferential, actual-
purpose standard.119 Proposing two varying degrees of inquiry was 
perhaps strategic on petitioners’ part: if the Court wants to avoid 
requiring lower courts to engage in the tenuous process of discerning 
legislative purpose that petitioners advanced, it can instead choose 
the more deferential standard proposed by the federal government. 
Given that the Commonwealth arguably conceded its true 
motivation was radiological safety in milling and tailings management, 
petitioners could prevail under an actual motivation standard under 
an approach similar to Arlington Heights.120 The justices, however, 
were highly skeptical of any approach requiring an expansive inquiry 
into legislative purpose,121 and seemed inclined to hold for 
respondents by determining that the purposive aspect of the provision 
does not apply unless the activity, as a threshold matter, is one 
governed by the NRC.122 
B. The Fourth Circuit Unconvincingly Distinguished Entergy and 
Skull Valley from Virginia Uranium 
Notwithstanding the problems with discerning legislative purpose, 
the majority of circuit court opinions favor the petitioners,123 and the 
Fourth Circuit inadequately distinguished Skull Valley and Entergy 
without addressing the other decisions.124 In Skull Valley, the Tenth 
 
 118.  Id. at 21:31. 
 119.  See id. at 58:10 (“Is the purpose for the protection against radiological hazards? That’s 
what Congress wants you to decide. And not just is it any plausible purpose . . . .”). See also 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1977). The Davis and Arlington Heights line of cases instructs that 
when plaintiffs can establish that a prohibited purpose behind an enactment is the motivating 
factor, then the burden shifts to the state actor to prove that the measure would have been 
enacted even in the absence of the motivating factor. 
 120.  See 429 U.S. at 270–71. 
 121.  See Oral Argument, supra note 117, at 9:38 (Sotomayor, J. asked, “Is this going to 
require deposing every single legislative member?”).  
 122.  See id. at 10:45 (Kagan, J. asked, “But you would concede, Mr. Cooper, that two states 
with exactly the same statutes, it could come out different ways because the legislative history 
was different in the two states?”); id. at 9:48 (Sotomayor, J. asked, “Because what do you look 
at? In a lot of these things, people just vote. They don’t say why. Or they do what one of my 
colleagues suggested, they give mixed motives. This is an odd way to read a preemption 
statute.”). 
 123.  See supra note 67. 
 124.  See Va. Uranium, 848 F.3d at 598–99. 
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Circuit defined the AEA’s preemptive scope in relation to several 
Utah statutes, including one that governed access to a road near a 
nuclear facility.125 Controlling road access in proximity to nuclear 
facilities does not directly interfere with any activity governed by the 
AEA.126 However, the panel in that case struck down the Utah statute 
after looking to legislative history showing that the provision was 
enacted “as a means of regulating radiological hazards.”127 While the 
road access provisions targeted transportation, “a category 
traditionally subject to local control,” they were nonetheless 
preempted because they were enacted for a purpose that the AEA 
preempts.128 
The Fourth Circuit majority emphasized that in Skull Valley, most 
of the provisions struck down specifically mentioned “spent nuclear 
fuel storage,” which is regulated by the NRC.129 The Fourth Circuit 
reasoned that the road access provision, properly contextualized 
within “a comprehensive scheme,” was plainly governing an NRC-
regulated activity even though the provision did not facially refer to 
one.130 This line of reasoning supports petitioners’ position. The Tenth 
Circuit properly inferred from context that the purpose behind the 
road access provision was to regulate an NRC-regulated activity, and 
it fortified its reasoning with legislative history.131 The Tenth Circuit 
was therefore conducting the same sort of purposive inquiry that 
petitioners urge here. A similar approach to Virginia Uranium would 
permit including extra-textual evidence in discerning the true purpose 
behind the legislature’s enactment of the moratorium. If petitioners 
could establish that the Commonwealth actually sought to regulate 
milling and tailings management with its ban, and did so motivated by 
concerns about radiological safety, the ban would be preempted by 
the AEA. 
Further, in Entergy, the Second Circuit held that the AEA 
preempted a Vermont law prohibiting nuclear plants from operating 
 
 125.  See Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1251–52. 
 126.  See id. at 1252. 
 127.  Id. at 1248. 
 128.  Va. Uranium, 848 F.3d at 610 (Traxler, J. dissenting).   
 129.  Id. at 598. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1252 (“The state legislator who sponsored the Road 
Provisions explained that they established a moat around the proposed SNF site, and the 
Governor added that the Road Provisions will add substantially to our ability as a state to 
protect the health and safety of our citizens against the storage of high-level nuclear waste.”) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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within the state without the legislature’s approval.132 Even though the 
Vermont statute explicitly disavowed that nuclear safety concerns 
undergirded the law, the Second Circuit engaged in a purposive 
inquiry133 and determined that Vermont was motivated primarily by 
nuclear safety concerns.134 Here, the Fourth Circuit distinguished 
Entergy by focusing on its “straightforward application of Pacific 
Gas” and not on the extratextual inquiry the Second Circuit 
employed in analyzing the AEA’s preemptive scope.135 Properly 
treated, Entergy stands for the proposition that courts “do not blindly 
accept the articulated purpose of [a state statute] for preemption 
purposes.”136 In the preemption analysis, Entergy indicates that courts 
are to give effect to both articulated language and evidence of 
purpose. The Court could adopt a similar approach if it opted to rule 
for petitioners. 
C. Nuclear Power is of Grave National Importance and the Conflict 
of Federalism in this Case Demands Clear Instruction from the 
Supreme Court 
The promotion of nuclear power is an important federal interest 
and the primary objective of the AEA.137 The AEA’s legislative 
history expresses Congress’s aim that government and private 
industry work in tandem to develop nuclear power for productive, 
non-military purposes.138 In the years since the AEA’s passage, 
Congress has legislated with the express desire to reduce reliance on 
natural gas and petroleum and to cultivate alternative energy sources 
 
 132.  See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 422 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 133.  See id. at 420 (“We need not repeat the entirety of the district court’s examination, 
which included considering many hours of audiotapes of floor debates and committee meetings 
for which written transcriptions are not typically maintained, except to note the remarkable 
consistency with which both state legislators and regulators expressed concern about 
radiological safety and expressed a desire to evade federal preemption.”). 
 134.  See id. at 420–22. 
 135.  Va. Uranium, 848 F.3d at 598–99. 
 136.  Entergy, 733 F.3d at 416 (alteration in original). 
 137.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 221 (1983). 
 138.  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 83-1699, 3457 (1954) (“Subject at all times to the paramount 
objective of assuring the common defense and security, the development and utilization of 
atomic energy shall, so far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare, 
increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and 
promoting world peace.”); H.R. REP. NO. 83-2181, at 9 (1954) (“[O]ur legislative proposals aim 
at encouraging flourishing research and development programs under both Government and 
private auspices.”). 
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like nuclear power.139 
Further, the political branches of the national government have 
emphasized the important interest in building a reliable supply of 
uranium for military and energy applications.140 Ninety-three percent 
of the United States’ domestic uranium supply is currently imported 
from foreign states.141 If the Supreme Court upholds Virginia’s ban on 
uranium mining, it would permit states to enact policy directly at odds 
with these important national interests out of localist concerns. The 
situation tees up an important conflict of federalism: the Court must 
choose whether to preclude the state’s exercise of a traditional police 
power in service of strong federal policy, or to permit a state to 
vindicate its own purposes at the expense of important national 
interests. 
Finally, the stakes are high not only for the litigants of this dispute, 
but also for lower courts adjudicating similar cases in the future.  
Therefore, the Court must determine the proper meaning of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2021(k) against the backdrop of the parties’ grave practical 
concerns142 and the lower courts’ ability to administer the statutory 
construction the Court ultimately holds to be correct.143 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Contextualizing a new age for nuclear technology, Justice White 
opened the Court’s opinion in Pacific Gas with reference to “the 
turning of swords into plowshares.”144 The awe-inspiring power of 
 
 139.  See, e.g., Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, 71 Stat. 576, 42 U.S.C. § 
2210 (2012) (limiting private liability for nuclear accidents; passed in 1954 and renewed in 2005 
for twenty years); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3291, 42 U.S.C. § 8301 et. 
seq. (2012) (providing that no new baseload electric powerplant may be constructed or operated 
without the capability to use coal or another alternate fuel as a primary energy source). 
 140.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 54 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2296b-3(a), 2296b-6(a) 
(2012); Final List of Critical Minerals 2018, 83 Fed. Reg. 23, 295 (May 18, 2018)). 
 141.  See Uranium Marketing Annual Report, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.eia.gov/uranium/marketing/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2018). 
 142.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 8 (“The development of this massive resource 
would also be economically advantageous for the region on a vast scale, leading to the creation 
of an estimated 1,052 annual jobs and nearly $5 billion of net revenue for local businesses.”); 
Brief for Respondents, supra note 7, at 25 (“Virginia’s power to regulate such activities within 
its borders ‘is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which [Virginia] enjoyed before the 
ratification of the Constitution and which [it] retain[s] today.’” (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 713 (1999))) (alteration in original).   
 143.  Cf. Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 741 (2017) (opting, by 7-0 
majority, for a particular statutory construction in part because it is more “administrable” than 
the alternative). 
 144.  Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 193. Here, the Court made reference to Isaiah 2:4: “And He 
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nuclear energy carries with it a legacy of destruction.145 But as the 
modern world faces increasing uncertainty in problems of climate, 
international relations, and the allocation of natural resources, putting 
nuclear power to more widespread, productive use provides attractive 
solutions. Virginia Uranium is about preemption doctrine and nuclear 
technology, but it also reflects broader societal and legal paradigms 
that arise when these important issues become the subject of 
litigation: the tensions between the global and the provincial, 
textualism and purposivism, federalism and states’ rights. As the 
justices interpret the AEA’s preemptive scope in Virginia Uranium, 
they would do well to keep these paradigms, and their principles, front 
of mind. 
 
 
will judge between the nations, And will render decisions for many peoples; And they will 
hammer their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not lift up 
sword against nation, And never again will they learn war.” 
 145.  See W.H. Lawrence, Atom Bomb Loosed on Nagasaki, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1945, at 
A1 (“The great bomb, which harnesses the power of the universe to destroy the enemy by 
concussion, blast and fire, was dropped on the second enemy city . . . .”). 
